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Rationalizing Hybrid Financial Instruments from an Usūlī Perspective 
 
Abstract 
This paper identifies a prime reason for the underdevelopment of the Muslim 
world to the lack of advancement of their financial intermediation system.  We 
instigate the employment of hybrid financial instruments to reinvigorate their 
financial architecture.  Not only does this solution satisfy the economic efficiency 
prerequisites, it is also in congruent with usūl al-fiqh (principles of Islamic 
jurisprudence). 
 
Keywords: juristic interpretation (Ijtihād), participating preferred ijārah (lease), 
principles of Islamic jurisprudence (Usūl al-fiqh). 
 
1.  Introduction 
Goldsmith in his well known 1969 text states that “one of the most important 
problems in the field of finance, if not the single most important one, ….is the effect 
that financial structure and development have on economic growth” (p. 390).1  
Centuries of economic underdevelopment of the Muslim world, as illustrated in 
Kuran (1997, 2003 and 2004), is deeply intertwined with the manner in which Islamic 
financial intermediation has evolved over the years.
2, 3, 4
  Whilst the causal factors are 
                                                 
1 Goldsmith, R. W., Financial structure and development (New Haven, CT, USA: Yale University 
Press, 1969). 
2 Kuran, Timur, 'Islam and Underdevelopment: An Old Puzzle Revisited', Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics, 153 (1997): 41-71. 
3 Kuran, Timur, 'The Islamic Commercial Crisis: Institutional Roots of Economic 
Underdevelopment in the Middle East', Journal of Economic History 63(2003): 414-446. 
3 
 
complex, the following factors have likely contributed to the issues undergirding the 
‘divergence’ in the economic development of some Muslim countries.  First, juristic 
interpretation (Ijtihād) in the area of commercial transactions has failed to advance 
Islamic Law beyond the customary practices (
c
urf) which were incorporated in the 
early era of the Prophet (PBUH) and the two generations after him, i.e. that of the 
pious predecessors (al-Salaf al-sāli'hīn).  Interlinked to this is the controversial issue 
of the ‘closure of the gates of Ijtihād’ (see Hallaq, 1984, for a survey of this debate).5  
The fact that Sharīcah (Islamic Law) scholars insist on emulating the classic financial 
instruments derived by employing subterfuges ('hīlah or ‘sharīcah –arbitrage’) 
reinforces the view that Islamic financial contracting is still embedded in a medieval 
worldview (see El-Gamal, 2006; and Khan, 2010).
6, 7
 
Second, twenty-first century financial intermediation, though not perfect, has 
evolved beyond pre-modern forms, encompassing financial economics along with 
various management sciences.  Its technical intricacies, no doubt, lay beyond the 
mandate and training of most Sharīcah scholars, which is not a criticism of this group 
per se, since specialised knowledge of worldly/temporal matters was never intended 
to be the primary function of these ‘inheritors of the Prophets’.  Imām Muslim 
reinforces this view with the following 'hadīth (tradition of the Prophet Muhammad) 
based on the Chapter ‘It is obligatory to follow the Prophet in all matters pertaining 
                                                                                                                                           
4 Kuran, Timur, 'Why the Middle East Is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical Mechanisms 
of Institutional Stagnation', Journal of Economic Perspectives 18(2004): 71-90. 
5 Hallaq, W., 'Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?' International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 
16(1)(1984): 3-41. 
6 El-Gamal, Mahmoud, A., Islamic Finance: Law, Economics and Practice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
7 Khan, Feisel, 'How ‘Islamic’ is Islamic Banking?' Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 76 (2010): 805-820. 
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to Religion, but one is free to act on one's own opinion in matters pertaining to 
technical skill.’: 
Rafi' b. Khadij reported that the Prophet saw the people grafting the trees 
when he migrated to Medina.  He inquired: What are you doing? They 
replied: We are grafting them, whereupon he expressed his disapproval by 
saying: It may be good for you if you do not do that, so they abandoned this 
practice, (and the date-palms) began to yield less fruit.  They made a 
mention of it (to the Prophet), whereupon he said: I am a human being, so 
when I command you about a thing pertaining to religion, do accept it, and 
when I command you about a thing out of my personal opinion, keep in 
mind that I am a human being.  
c
Ikrima reported that he said something like 
this."  (see Siddiqui, 1986; hadīth # 5831).8 
 
To bridge this divide, Al Alwānī (1997) recommends joint ijtihād between 
Sharīcah scholars, financial economists and practitioners.9  Given the economic 
under-development of the Muslim world, this article recommends a radical approach 
towards enhancing efficiency of financial intermediation, contrary to the current form 
of Islamic banking transactions that are deeply reliant on: (i) cost-plus-mark-up 
structures (Murāba'ha); and (ii) its variant in the form of Tawarruq (structured as a 
muraba'ha with an immediate sale of the underlying real asset), yielding a pure 
ribawī debt vehicle.10 
                                                 
8 Siddiqui, Abdul Hamid,  Sahih Muslim-Translation (New Delhi, India: Kitab Bhavan, 1986), 
IV:1259-60 (hadīth # 5831). 
9  Al 'Alwānī, Tāha Jabir, 'The Role of Islamic Ijtihad in the Regulation and Correction of Capital 
Markets', American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 14(3)(1997): 39-66. 
10  See below for more clarification of the Arabic term ribawī. 
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This improvement in efficiency is achieved through the employment of a family 
of hybrid financial securities (or structured financial facilities) detailed below, which 
are generically termed the Participating Preferred Ijārah (PPI) Facility.  The facility 
is demonstrated by Ebrahim and Hussain (2010) as being economically efficient 
(Pareto-optimal) over both pure debt and pure equity structures.
11
  It is also 
advocated as a primary funding vehicle, as well as a work-out one in the current 
financial crisis (see Ebrahim et al. 2011).
12
  We elaborate the structure of this facility 
in Section II, and rationalize its employment from the Sharīcah perspective in Section 
III.  Section IV provides the concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Elaboration on the Array of Hybrid (Structured) Financial Facilities 
Hybrid securities range between the two extreme forms of financial 
intermediation, i.e. ribawī debt and residual equity.  Debt in the jargon of finance is 
employed to boost earnings of the entrepreneur (or equity owner), without absolving 
control rights over the venture, as it is generally non-voting.  However, the Qur'ān, in 
contrast to the well-known Nobel Prize winning Modigliani and Miller Theorem 
(1958), reprimands employment of this form of usurious (ribawī) financing.  Salleh et 
al. (2013) in their study on the economic rationale behind the Qur'ānic injunction of 
ribā an-nasī’ah attributes it to the: (i) potential expropriation of assets of either 
borrower or lender (see Q. 2:275, 2:278-279, 2:281, 3:130-132, 4:161, 30:39); (ii) 
transfer of fragility to the financial system (see Q. 2:280); and (iii) financial exclusion 
                                                 
11 Ebrahim, M. Shahid, and Hussain, Sikandar, 'Financial Development and Asset Valuation: The 
Special Case of Real Estate', Journal of Banking and Finance 34 (2010): 150-162. 
12 Ebrahim, M. Shahid, Shackleton, Mark B., and Wojakowski, Rafal M., 'Participating mortgages 
and the efficiency of financial intermediation', Journal of Banking and Finance 35 (2011): 3042-
3054. 
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of the poor (see Q. 2:276-277, 30:39).
13
  The recent subprime crisis, emanating from 
mortgages to borrowers without proper assessment on their capacity to service the 
facility, thereby violating all the above Qur'ānic injunctions, disseminated into a 
sovereign debt crisis.  This basically vindicates the Islamic perspective over 
contemporary views of economists who endorse ribawī financing.  Congruent with 
the Qur'ānic injunctions, Salleh et al. (2013) recommend the employment of hybrid 
securities for the circumvention of issues (i) and (ii), while charitable funds 
(emanating from sadaqah, zakāt etc.) can be deployed to avoid issues (i) and (iii).14 
The PPI (hybrid securities) discussed in Salleh et al. (2013) is created by 
merging a special Ijārah (leasing) facility with a Mudārabah (equity contract with 
restricted voting rights) structure that is secured by real assets of a firm (or underlying 
project).
15
  The hybrid security provides an option-like facility that integrates 
downside ‘risk-sharing’ with the upside ‘profit-sharing’ (see also Kamali, 1997; and 
the Figure below).
16
  It also confers a ‘preferred’ status to the financier who then 
ranks higher than the equity-owner.  The PPI is inspired by Participating Mortgages 
(PM), which are instrumental in reconciling the conflict of interest (agency cost of 
debt) between financiers and real estate developers, especially in case of construction 
loans (see Ebrahim et al., 2011).
17
  This accrues to the long gestational period in real 
estate development to reach a state where the payoffs are sufficient to service the 
                                                 
13  Salleh, Murizah, O., Jaafar, Aziz, Ebrahim, M. Shahid, and Molyneux, Philip, 'Has the 
Prohibition of Interest Hindered Development of the Muslim World?' Working Paper, Bangor 
Business School, North Wales, U.K. (2013). 
14  Ibid. 
15  Ibid. 
16  Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, , Islamic Commercial Law: An Analysis of Options, American 
Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 14(3) (1997): 14-37. 
17  Supra note 12 at p. 4. 
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fixed interest obligations ensuing from a traditional ribawī mortgage.  Thus, investors 
are in a state of predicament, as low levels of cash flow in the construction phase 
expose them to default risk, while financiers are debarred from benefiting from the 
success of the real estate venture (in a ribawī mortgage).  A PM offers a compromise 
where the financier is compensated with a share in the future payoffs (in the operating 
and/ or terminal state) in lieu of a reduction in payment during the construction 
phases.  The proposed PPI facility extends the PM by incorporating downside risk 
sharing with a capped Ijārah portion. 
 
Figure: Preferred Participating Ijārah Facility 
 
 
The above figure illustrates the various forms of a PPI facility.  This involves 
various combinations of participatory components such as: (i) Preferred Shared 
Appreciation Ijārah (PSAI), where the financier subsidizes the pure Ijārah 
obligations in return for a share in the appreciation of the firm (or project); (ii) 
Preferred Equity Ijārah (PSEI), where the financier is the co-owner sharing different 
amounts of income and appreciation (in contrast to a pure equity form proposed by 
Siddiqi (1983) and Chapra (2006); and (iii) Preferred Shared Income Ijārah (PSII), 
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where the financier subsidizes the Ijārah obligations in return for a share in the 
income from operation.
18, 19
 
A PPI security is generally preferable to a convertible one for the following 
reasons: (i) it alleviates the fragility of the financial system by "giving respite to 
borrowers" (Qur’ān 2:280); (ii) it is malleable in three dimensions yielding the 
variants such as PSAI, PSEI and PSII, as illustrated in the above Figure; and (iii) it 
allows an investor to retain control of the firm even in the good state of the economy, 
unlike convertible debt, where the conversion to equity dilutes these control rights.  A 
PPI (in general) reduces the agency costs of debt better than plain vanilla (ribawī) 
debt or that of a banking-murāba'hah or a tawwaruq facility (see Corollary, Ebrahim 
and Hussain, 2010).
20
 
 
3.  Rationalizing the PPI Security from an Islamic Perspective  
There are several hermeneutic approaches which could be employed to 
rationalise the employment of PPI in a Muslim financial intermediation system. The 
most widely accepted, which is adopted for the purposes of this paper, is the approach 
of classical usūl, referred to here as the Usūlī-rationalisation approach. It is closely 
aligned with classical Muslim jurisprudential theory – Usūl al-fiqh – and should 
satisfy the demands of parties involved in Islamic Finance who have a preference for 
arguments constructed on the basis of classical jurisprudential instruments.  Historical 
approaches, such as the double-movement theory advocated by Fazlur Rahman 
                                                 
18 Siddiqi, M. Nejatullah, Banking without interest (Leceister, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1983). 
19  Chapra, M.U., 'Why has Islam prohibited interest? Rationale beyond the prohibition of interest'. 
In A. S. Thomas (Ed.), Interest in Islamic economics: Understanding riba (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2006). 
20  Supra note 11 at p. 4. 
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(1982), could also be employed to justify PPI; approaches such as these aim via 
historical criticism to extract the principles that underpin Qur'ānic ethico-legal 
injunctions and then apply these to realities which the Muslim community faces in 
modern times.
21
  Whilst such approaches can afford a more coherent and robust 
justification for financial instrument like PPI, they are at the same time more intricate 
which renders them inappropriate for a paper of this scope. 
 
Usūlī-rationalisation of PPI: 
For this, we resort to the following principles of classical Islamic legal theory: 
 
One – The Sharīcah aims at securing benefits (jalb al-masāli'h) and preventing 
harm (daf 
c
 al-dharar): 
According to the majority of jurists and theologians, the Sharīcah is inherently 
rational in both its prescriptions and proscriptions. Often the Qur'ān provides the 
rationale for its positive and negative rulings, such that the proscriptions of drinking 
wine (khamr) and gambling (maysir) are aimed at warding off hostility and division: 
By means of intoxicants and games of chance, Satan seeks only to sow 
enmity and hatred among you, and to turn you away from the 
remembrance of God and from prayer. Will you not, then, desist? 
(Q.5:91) 
 
With consideration for the rational underpinnings of the Qur'ān’s legal 
injunctions, jurists have inducted that the raison d’être of Islamic Law is to acquire 
benefits for Muslims and to protect them from harm (jalb al-masāli'h wa dar’ al-
mafāsid). This applies to both areas of law, ritual worship (cibādāt) and worldly 
                                                 
21  Rahman, Fazlur , Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1982). 
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transactions (mu
cāmalāt).  In this context, the Spanish jurist Abū Ishāq al-Shātibī (d. 
1388) says: 
 
By induction (istiqrā’) I have come to be certain that the Sharīcah exists 
for the benefit (masāli'h) of worshippers. God, the Exalted, says 
concerning the principle behind the commissioning of Messengers, ‘[We 
sent all these] apostles as heralds of glad tidings and as warners, so that 
men might have no excuse before God after [the coming of] these 
apostles.’ (Q. 4:125); ‘And We have not sent you save as a mercy to the 
world.’ (Q. 21:107). And He says about the purpose of creation, ‘He it is 
Who created the heavens and the earth in six Days - and His Throne was 
over the waters - that He might try you, which of you is best in conduct.’ 
(Q. 11:7); ‘And I did not create the Jinn and men save to worship Me.’ 
(Q. 51:56)...As concerns the effective causes (ta
c
līl) underpinning the 
details of laws in the Book and the Sunnah, they are greater than can be 
enumerated, such as God saying after the verse of ablution, ‘God does 
not intend for you hardship, rather He wants you to be cleansed and He 
wants to complete His favour upon you.’ (Q. 5: 6); and about fasting, He 
says, ‘Fasting is prescribed for you as it was for those from aforetime so 
that you may attain God-consciousness.’ (Q. 2: 183)...Since induction 
indicates this; and it is, in such cases, the vehicle to achieve certainty; 
then we should be convinced that the matter is repeated in all details of 
law. Based on the citations above, there is furthermore a sound basis for 
11 
 
analogical reasoning (qiyās) and legal reasoning (ijtihād).” (al-
Muwāfaqāt, II: 322).22 
 
This being so, any case requiring a legal ruling should be evaluated on the basis 
of its associated benefits and harms. Where the benefits outweigh the harms, such a 
case may legitimately be regarded as permissible; in contradistinction, where the 
harms outweigh the benefits, a case may be judged as impermissible. Since harms 
and benefits are variables which are dependent upon the three factors of time, place 
and person, this process must be constantly subjected to review.  
Thus, we rationalize the permissibility of PPI in accordance with the principle of 
securing benefits (jalb al-masāli'h) and preventing harm (daf c al-darar). 
The principle of permissibility (qācidat al-ibā'hah) may also be invoked to 
support PPI, but it should be made clear that it is most relevant when a new case has 
not had an opportunity to be subjected to juristic analysis. This principle has been 
extracted by the inductive method and is based on several verses of the Qur'ān: 
We have subjugated to you all that is in the heavens and the earth 
(Q.45:13). 
He it is who created for you all that is on the earth (Q.2:29). 
Allah has explained to you in detail what is forbidden to you unless you are 
compelled to it" (Q.6:119). 
And Allah will not mislead a people after He has guided them, so that He 
makes clear to them what to fear (and what to avoid) (Q.9:115). 
 
                                                 
22  Al-Shātibī, Ab­ Ishāq, al-Muwāfaqāt fī usūl al- Sharīcah (4 vols.) (Beirut, Lebanon: Dār al-
Ma
c
rifa, 2001). 
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It is important to note that the principle of ibā'hah should not be invoked for 
matters that fall within the domain of ritual worship (
c
ibādāt), since it is generally 
outside the remit of human reason to formulate rules pertaining to ritual worship; in 
contrast, the maxim does have its rightful place in the domain of mundane worldly 
affairs (‘umūr dunyawiyyah).  Further, it is mainly concerned with commercial 
transactions, which are permissible as long as ‘nothing in them is forbidden’, as stated 
by Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328).  Indeed according to the Damascene jurist, “God Most 
High never prohibited a contract in which there is benefit for Muslims and does not 
inflict harm upon them.” (Majmūc al-Fatāwā, XVII: 65).23 
 
Two – Bringing Ease (Taysīr) and Removal of Hardship (Rafc-al-'haraj): 
This principle is enshrined in the cardinal objectives (maqāsid) of the Sharīcah 
as explained by al-Shātibī:  
Know that hardship ('haraj) is lifted away from the legally responsible 
agent (mukallaf) for two reasons: The first reason is from fear that he will 
stray from the right path, detest worship, and shun legal responsibility; 
stemming from this is fear that he will come to ruin either physically, 
mentally or financially; The second reason is from fear that he will be 
over-burdened with responsibilities. For example, he is responsible for 
his family and children as well as other things that confront him on his 
path; too many responsibilities may lead to attention on some to the 
detriment of others. Despite his desire to juggle each, the mukallaf could 
ultimately become disengaged. (al-Muwāfaqāt, II: 440).24 
                                                 
23  Ibn Taymiyya, Taqī al-Dīn, Majmūc al-Fatāwā (37 vols.) (Beirut, Lebanon: Dār al-kutub al-
c
ilmiyya, 2000), XVII: 65. 
24  Supra note 22 at p. 10. 
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Al-Shātibī and other jurists justify the principle of facilitation and removal of 
hardship on the basis of the Qur'ān and Sunnah. 
"God does not burden a soul beyond its capacity" (Q.2:286). 
"God wishes to lighten your difficulties, for man was created weak" 
(Q.4:28). 
"God intends every facility for you, and He does not want to put you into 
difficulty" (Q.2:185). 
"God desires not to inflict any hardship upon you" (Q.5:6) 
"Bring ease, not hardship, and give good news, not gloom" (Muslim, hadīth 
no. 1112). 
"The best of your religion is that which is easy" (Ahmed ibn Hanbal, Fihris 
Ahādīth Musnad al-Imām Ahmed b. Hanbal, compiled by Abū Hajir 
Zaghlul, Beirut, Dār al-Kutub, 1405/1985, IV, 338). 
"Whoever forbids leniency closes the door to goodness" (Muslim, 
Mukhtasar Sahīh Muslim, p. 474, hadīth no. 1783). 
 
We rationalize the employment of PPI, as it facilitates efficient financial 
intermediation system, in harmony with the above two Sharīcah principles (and the 
two below).  One can deem the facility as a ‘Sharīcah-Pareto’ efficient solution. 
 
Three – The Freedom to Contract (Hurriyyat al-tacāqud): 
The Qur'ānic basis for this principle is the verse, “O you who believe! Eat not 
up your property among yourselves in vanities: But let there be amongst you traffic 
and trade by mutual good-will.” (Q. 4:29). Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350), in 
explanation of this principle, notes that the parties to a contract are free to stipulate 
14 
 
and add conditions to it as they deem fit, as long as it does not violate the clear 
prohibitions of the Sharīcah (Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, I: 344).25  This is reinforced by 
his teacher and mentor Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), who states that the Qur’anic 
instruction to people to "fulfil their contracts" (Q. 5:1) is broad and comprehensive, 
comprising every contract the Lawgiver (i.e. God) has not specifically forbidden 
(Majmūc al-fatāwā, XVII: 65).26  It should be borne in mind that the concept of 
Sharīcah for both student and teacher is a cognate for justice; Ibn Taymiyya says, 
“God supports the just state (al-dawlah al-cādilah) though it be non-Muslim and He 
does not support the unjust [state] though it be Muslim. For this reason, it is said, 
‘The earthly world (dunya) continues to turn with justice and disbelief but it cannot 
continue with injustice and Islam.’” (see Holland, 1983).27  The basic requirements 
are the mutual consent of all parties, which is defined in the verse above, as well as 
contract stipulations which are fair.  See Kamali (2002) for other views on the issue.
28
 
Thus, from the above principle of freedom of contracting, the PPI facility should 
be permitted. 
 
                                                 
25  Al-Jawziyyah, Ibn Qayyim, I
clām al-Muwaqqicīn can Rabb al-cĀlamīn (Cairo, Egypt: Maktabah 
al-Kulliyyat al-Azhariyyah, 1968): 1, 344. 
26  Supra note 23 at p. 11.  
27  Holland, M.. Public Duties in Islam: The Institution of Hisba by Ibn Taymiyya, Translation 
(Leicester, UK: Islamic Foundation, 1983): 95. 
28 Kamali, Mohammad Hashim, 'The Sharīcah Perspective on Commercial Transactions', In: Kamali, 
M.H., Islamic Commercial Law: An Analysis of Futures and Options (Selangor, Malaysia: Ilmiah 
Publishers Sdn Bhd., 2002): 66-83. 
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Four –  Mutual Cooperation (al-tacāwun) and Conflict Avoidance (daf c al-
c
adāwah): 
The Qur’ānic basis for this principle is the verse, “…and assist one another in 
righteousness and piety, but do not assist one another in sin and hostility”. (Q. 5:2). 
Islamic Law in the area of mu
cāmalāt is predicated on the prevention of conflict, 
exploitation and injustice among people (Kamali 2002).
29
  Furthermore, to promote 
economic cooperation among the Muslim fraternity, it incorporates provisions such 
as charity (sadaqah) and benevolent loans (qard 'hasan); these are extended to both 
the needy as well as to the entrepreneur.  
In Section II of this article, we illustrated how interest-bearing debt contract runs 
afoul of at least three attributes of ribā described in the Qur’ān.  Further, the conflict 
which Kamali (2002) discusses can be identified as that between a borrower and a 
lender.
30
  This is termed as the agency cost of debt in the finance literature and 
explained as follows. 
When firms are financed with ribawī debt (or so-called ‘Islamic’ debt facilities 
stemming from a banking-murāba'hah or a tawwaruq facility), manager-entrepreneur 
has an incentive to transfer the downside risk (of the venture) to the financiers, while 
benefiting from the upside potential.  This is a well-known problem of risk-shifting or 
asset-substitution.  A number of studies, such as Smith and Warner (1979) and Barclay 
and Smith (1995), have illustrated that risk management through the use of secured 
debt alleviates this issue.
31,
 
32
 Other studies, such as Haugen and Senbet (1981) and 
                                                 
29
  Ibid. 
30
  Ibid. 
31  Smith, Clifford W. Jr., and Warner, Jerold B., 'On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond 
Covenants', Journal of Financial Economics 7(2) (1979): 117-161. 
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Green (1984), have argued that participating clauses and other forms of financial 
innovations also mitigate this issue by allowing the financier to share in any windfall 
that the manager-entrepreneur receives.
33, 34
 
A second type of agency problem associated with ribawī debt financing (or 
banking-murāba'hah or tawwaruq facility) is referred to as the under-investment 
problem (see Myers, 1977).
35
  Here, manager-entrepreneurs are motivated to reject 
positive Net Present Value (NPV) investment proposals if the wealth enhancement 
associated with the venture accrues mostly to financiers.  Bodie and Taggart (1978) 
and others have argued that financial innovations in the form of participation clauses 
can be employed to mitigate this issue.
36
 
Thus, employment of PPI can be used to mitigate the endogenous agency cost of 
debt more efficiently than an interest bearing debt facility or contemporary ‘Islamic’ 
ones of banking-murāba'hah or tawwaruq.  This alleviates the inherent conflict of 
interest between manager-entrepreneurs and financiers. 
 
                                                                                                                                           
32  Barclay, M.J. and Smith, C.W., 'The Priority Structure of Corporate Liabilities', Journal of 
Finance 50 (1995): 899-917. 
33  Haugen, R., and Senbet L.W., 'Resolving the Agency Problems of External Capital through Stock 
Options', Journal of Finance 36 (1981): 629-647. 
34  Green, R.C., 'Investment Incentives, Debt, and Warrants', Journal of Financial Economics 13 
(1984): 115-136. 
35  Myers, Stewart C., 'Determinants of corporate borrowing', Journal of Financial Economics, 5(2) 
(1977): 147-175. 
36  Bodie, Z. and Taggart, R.A., Future Investment Opportunities and the Value of Call Provision on 
a Bond, Journal of Finance 33 (1978): 1187-1200. 
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4.  Conclusion 
This article recommends the employment of a Preferred Participating Ijārah 
(Structured Hybrid) facility to redeem centuries of economic malaise in the Muslim 
world. This facility is ‘Sharīcah-Pareto’ efficient and can be used as a primary 
financing vehicle as well as a work-out vehicle (after the default of a ribawī facility or 
that of an ‘Islamic’ banking-murāba'hah or a tawwaruq facility or a pure ijārah).  It 
can be assimilated into the Islamic financial architecture which resembles a Universal 
banking system, where the financial intermediary funds the entrepreneur-manager, in 
return for a preferred participation of profits (and/or terminal payoffs).  Since the 
facility is consistent with the overarching aim of Islamic Law – namely, the securing 
of benefits for the Muslim community and averting from it harm – as well as the sub-
principles of: (i) taysīr (bringing ease) and raf c al-'haraj (removal of hardship); (ii) 
'hurriyyat al-ta
cāqud (freedom to contract); (iii) mutual cooperation and conflict 
avoidance; and (iv) not being in contradiction with the key prohibitions set out in the 
Qur'ān, such as those linked with ribā and maysir; it is clearly an instrument which 
should be considered legally permissible (mubā'h). 
 
 
